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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the wage gap between informal and formal salary workers
in South Africa, Brazil and Mexico. We use rich datasets that allow us to de￿ne informality in a
relatively comparable fashion across countries. We compute precise wage di⁄erentials by accounting
for taxes paid in the formal sector. For each country, we analyze how the sectoral wage gap varies
within groups, between groups and over time. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we use
large (unbalanced) panels to estimate ￿xed e⁄ects models at the mean and at di⁄erent points of the
wage distribution. We ￿nd that unobserved heterogeneity explains a large part of the (conditional)
wage gap. The remaining informal sector wage penalty is large in the lower part of the distribution
but almost disappears at the top. The penalty primarily concerns young workers and is found
to be procyclical. We carefully investigate the robustness of these results and discuss their policy
implications as well as regularities across countries.
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The existence of large informal sectors in developing countries has often been cited as a central factor un-
derlying wage inequality, persistent poverty and labor market ine¢ ciencies. According to the traditional
view (Fields, 1975, Dickens and Lang, 1985), workers enter informality to escape unemployment and
because they are rationed out of the formal sector as a result of an overly regulated labor market. They
earn less than identical workers in the formal sector ￿wages in the latter are set above market-clearing
prices because of minimum wages, higher unionization or e¢ ciency-wage explanations. Some authors
have recently questioned the traditional paradigm, arguing that an important fraction of informal jobs
may re￿ ect the voluntary choice of workers given their preferences, skill endowments and competing
earnings prospects.1 If labor markets are competitive, wage equalization should eventually occur ￿or
remaining wage gaps could be justi￿ed by compensating di⁄erentials in one or the other sector.2 Recent
labor market modelling has combined the two polar views into a dual representation of the informal sector
where a competitive or ￿ voluntary entry￿sector coexists with a rationed ￿ lower-tier￿segment (Funkhouser,
1997, Maloney, 2004, Fields, 2005).
In this context, accurate measures of wage di⁄erentials across sectors represent an important aspect of
the analysis of labor markets in developing countries. Admittedly, they do not constitute a comprehensive
measure of welfare nor do they allow testing directly the hypothesis of segmentation on the labor market
(Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985, Magnac, 1991, Gindling, 1991, Maloney, 1999); yet they provide a ￿rst
important step on the way. If inter-sectoral pay inequalities are too large to re￿ ect pure compensating
di⁄erentials across sectors, they may suggest the existence of rigidities and the need for policy action to
restore e¢ ciency and to improve the ￿nancial conditions of the poorest workers.
Importantly, robust measures of earnings di⁄erentials are typically hampered by two caveats. Firstly,
unobserved individual characteristics of workers are rarely accounted for. Since unobserved skills may
be correlated with both sector choice and earnings, recent studies have implemented two-stage models
where selection is jointly speci￿ed with the wage regressions, possibly in a dynamic framework (e.g.,
Gong and Van Soest, 2002, on Mexican data).3 Recently, Badaoui et al. (2008) have also used the panel
structure of the South African labor survey to control for time invariant unobservables. Interestingly,
several authors ￿nd that unobserved characteristics explain a great deal of the average informal sector
wage penalty. Secondly, it may be empirically di¢ cult to draw a line between high- and low-tier informal
sectors. While such a dual representation is convenient for modelling purposes, the informal sector is
likely to present a high degree of heterogeneity.4 As a result, the informal wage gap may change gradually
1Evidence of voluntary selection into the informal sector has been particularly compelling for Latin America and for
self-employed workers. In particular, see Maloney (1999, 2004) for Mexico, Yamada (1996) and Saavedra and Chong (1999)
for Peru and Brazil.
2An apparent informal sector wage penalty could in fact be compensated by non-wage job characteristics in this sector
(e.g., independence and job ￿exibility, training area for young workers, etc.). Inversely, informal workers could enjoy higher
wage rates to compensate for the non-receipt of social security bene￿ts (medical coverage, pension) in the formal sector.
Yet this is not necessarily the case as the perceived value of these bene￿ts may be low, either because these services are
traditionally provided through family support or because workers may be aware of ine¢ ciencies in formal sector protection.
They may also balance these bene￿ts against the possibility to avoid taxes in the informal sector (Maloney, 1999).
3Note also the use of matching estimators by Pratap and Quintin (2006) and the application of models of essential
heterogeneity in Arias and Khamis (2007) to examine the links between earnings performance and the choice of self-
employment and formal/informal salaried work.
4Notwithstanding, several interesting studies show that the dual representation of the informal sector proves to be a
better alternative than polar models. Cunningham and Maloney (2001) represent the informal sector as a mixture of upper-
tier and lower-tier enterprises (formal sector employment is not an option in their model). Guenther and Launov (2006)
also account for an (unobserved) dual structure of the informal labor market but additionally consider selection bias due
1along the wage distribution or with workers￿attributes. Recent contributions thus depart from simple
estimation of the wage gap at the mean, which may su⁄er from heteroscedasticity and fail to capture
important information. Quantile regression (QR) techniques unveil more complex patterns and allow
rich distributional analyses (e.g., Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002, and Tannuri-Pianto et al., 2004, for
Brazil and Bolivia respectively).5
This paper provides new evidence on the informal-formal wage gap among salary workers in South
Africa, Brazil and Mexico. Our ￿rst contribution is an accurate account of raw wage di⁄erentials; in
particular, we re￿ne usual measures by adjusting wages for the taxes paid in the formal sector.6 Secondly,
we use rich datasets to de￿ne informality in the most comparable way across countries, adopting the
legalistic view based on the receipt of social security by formal sector employees ￿and consistent with the
payment of taxes and social security contributions by these workers. Our third and main contribution
derives from a methodological perspective. We exploit the availability of large (rotating) panels to
estimate the informal wage penalty along the distribution while accounting for workers￿ unobserved
characteristics. Previous attempts have relied on the application of instrumental variable techniques to
quantile regression (IV-QR), as suggested for instance by Buchinsky (1998). Acknowledging the di¢ culty
to ￿nd convincing instruments for sector choice, we suggest an alternative approach relying on time
variation in individual wages and labor market sector histories. The idea is simply to use ￿ ￿xed e⁄ects￿
panel regressions at di⁄erent points of the wage distribution.7
New results complete the existing literature for the three countries under investigation. Despite
potential di⁄erences in the functioning of the labor markets and the nature of informality across countries,
interesting similarities are revealed. In all three countries, we observe a raw wage penalty for informal
salary workers throughout the wage distribution, partly explained by ￿ better￿observed and unobserved
characteristics in the formal sector. Yet a signi￿cant penalty remains at the bottom while it tends to
disappear at the top in all three countries. Finally, we investigate between-group heterogeneity and
time variations of the wage gap. We show in particular that informal wage penalties primarily concern
younger workers; also, ￿ uctuations of the wage gap are smoothed out when accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity and reveal the procyclical nature of the informal sector penalty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some detailed discussion about labor markets
in the three countries under study. Section 3 presents the data selection, the identi￿cation of informality
and the construction of net wages. The econometric approach is detailed in section 4. Section 5 discusses
the empirical results and section 6 reports robustness checks and extensions. Section 7 concludes.
to participation decisions (as in Magnac 1991).
5In "switching models", the (estimated) sectoral wage gap explicitly enters in the sector choice equation. However, the
simultaneous estimation of wages (in each sector) and sector choice is not standard in the context of quantile estimations.
The present paper thus suggests an alternative approach to account for unobserved characteristics.
6The role of taxes on employment and wages in formal and informal sectors has recently received attention in theoretical
work (e.g., Albrecht et al., 2006) and empirical studies (e.g., Badaoui et al., 2008, for South Africa).
7To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst application of the ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression estimators of Koenker (2004)
and Canay (2008) to the measure of the informal wage gap.
22 Labor Markets and Informality in Brazil, South Africa and
Mexico
The question of informality has received a lot of attention in the literature. A large amount of evidence
is summarized in Leontaridi (1998), Perry et al. (2007), J￿tting et al. (2007), Ru⁄er and Knight (2007),
among others. In this section, we simply provide a brief background description for each country. We
show that the evidence on wage di⁄erentials and inter-sector mobility is mixed.
In Brazil, the informal sector comprises more than ten million ￿rms; 70% of them are located in
local commerce and small services (cf., Informal Urban Economy Survey 2003). The stringent labor
legislation is usually blamed for the large informal sector, especially following the 1988 constitutional
changes (Barros and Corseuil, 2001). Several macroeconomic crises, with alternating periods of recession
and high in￿ ation, may have also contributed to the expansion of the informal sector ￿the latter accounts
for 87% of the jobs created between 1992 and 2002.8 For the recent period, the Monthly Employment
Survey indicates that informal employment remains high, with a share of total employment ￿ uctuating
between 30% and 35% over 2002-2005.
Carneiro and Henley (2001) and Menezes-Filho et al. (2004) show that for some workers, the informal
sector may be a desirable form of employment in Brazil; they also ￿nd that the large informal wage gap
can be explained by selection bias and consequently favor the competitive markets hypothesis. This view
seems to be supported by studies on sectoral mobility. Barros et al. (1990) ￿nd high mobility rates
between sectors in the Sao Paulo region while Ru⁄er and Knight (2007) argue that there cannot be wage
segmentation if there is such free mobility between sectors. In contrast, other studies report evidence
of large wage di⁄erentials ￿that may favor the segmentation hypothesis ￿in the lower part of the wage
distribution (Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002).
South Africa is somewhat di⁄erent from African and Latin American countries. It is indeed character-
ized by a relatively small informal sector which coexists with high unemployment. According to Kingdon
and Knight (2007), the overall proportions of informal employment and unemployment are estimated to
24% and 29% respectively in 2003; focusing on salary workers, Badaoui et al. (2008) evaluate the informal
sector at 11% of the total labor force. The relatively small size of the informal sector is partly on account
of the potential hidden costs in the high-tier informal segment (due in particular to land/credit con-
straints, inhibition of entrepreneurial skills and high crime rate against self-employed owners, cf. Fields,
2006). Another reason is that reservation wages may be higher in South Africa than in lower income
countries ￿the unemployed who receive some support from within or beyond the household may prefer
to remain outside the low-tier informal sector where real income is very low (Kingdon and Knight, 2001).
Several authors point toward sharp segmentation between the formal and informal segments of the
labor market (Hofmeyr, 2002, Kingdon and Knight, 2007), highlighting the role of trade unions, collective
bargaining and labor standards (work hours, minimum wages) in ￿ registered￿employment. Informal sector
wages, being more subject to market forces, are about 60% lower according to Kingdon and Knight (2007).
Yet informality seems to be a rather dynamic segment of the South African labor market according to
some other studies. For the region of KwaZulu-Natal, Valodia et al. (2006) and Cichello et al. (2005),
8Trade liberalization in the early 1990s must have put some pressure on the tradable good sector, resulting in large
movements of labor out of the (formal) manufacturing sector and into the informal part of the service sector, with relatively
contained unemployment (Hoek, 2007).
3￿nd that for many workers, the informal sector has generated more employment and shown faster wage
progression in the 1990s.
The study of informality in Mexico has received a lot of attention in the literature. Marcouiller et al.
(1997) show that this sector represents 31% of total employment when de￿ned according to ￿rm size but
more than 43% when the social security de￿nition is used. Maloney (1999) reports that movement from
formal salaried to self-employment is associated with a wage increase. Studying mobility patterns across
business cycles for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Bosch and Maloney (2007) suggest that a substantial
part of the informal sector, particularly the self-employed, likely corresponds to voluntary entry while
informal salaried work may correspond more closely to the standard queuing view, especially for younger
workers. Gong et al. (2004) ￿nd that entry and exit rates for the formal sector are lower than for the
informal sector; the probability of formal sector employment increases with the education level, possibly
in response to higher returns to education attached to formal jobs. Gong and van Soest (2002) con￿rm
this view, suggesting that the dual structure is supported for highly educated workers but not for low-
educated ones. They also ￿nd that the lagged sector state does not a⁄ect current wages, once wage
di⁄erentials and unobserved heterogeneity are accounted for.
3 Measuring the Raw Wage Gap
3.1 Data
For Brazil, we make use of the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME)
conducted by the Brazilian Statistical Agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra￿ae Estatistica, IBGE).
This household survey covers the six largest metropolitan areas of Brazil (i.e., Belo Horizonte, Porto
Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Sao Paulo). Households are interviewed four months in a
row and re-interviewed eight months later for another four months, hence workers are observed at most
twice over a two-year period. We use the ￿rst and ￿fth interviews, creating a panel with observations
that are a year apart. We focus on years 2002 to 2007.
For South Africa, we use the labor Force Survey (LFS), a rotating panel conducted by Statistics South
Africa (Stats SA) and covering all provincial areas, both urban and rural. Twenty percent of the sampling
units are rotated out of the survey and replaced with a new sample every six months; workers are therefore
observed ￿ve times at most over a two-and-a-half year period. We use the waves of September 2001 to
March 2007.
For Mexico, we rely on the National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE) conducted by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geographica e Informatica (INEGI). This is a quarterly survey with
a rotation scheme of 20%, i.e., workers are observed at most ￿ve times over a ￿ve-quarter period. The
ENOE is a recent version of the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) which now includes
information on rural areas. We use data from the ￿rst quarter 2005 to the third quarter 2008.
These surveys provide information about job characteristics, incomes, work duration, demographics
and education. Also, households are identi￿ed over time but individuals are not. Therefore, we construct
the individual panel by linking individuals within households over time on the basis of gender, race and
age. The attrition resulting from this procedure is relatively high in Brazil (58%) and smaller in South
Africa and Mexico (28% and 32% respectively). While it might be expected that workers in the informal
sector are more likely to exit from the panel because of higher migration or higher misreporting, we ￿nd
4that sample attrition does not relate to labor market status (see also Antman and McKenzie, 2007, for
Mexico and Badaoui et al., 2008, for South Africa).
3.2 De￿ning Informality
An important aspect concerning the data is the possibility to identify informality in a fairly consistent
way. There is generally no consensus on how to de￿ne the phenomenon of labor market informality
in developing economies but most studies opt for either the productive view (based on job types or
￿rm size) or the so-called legalistic or social protectionist view. In the latter, informality corresponds
to the lack/avoidance of formal registration, taxation, regulation of maximum working hours or worker
protection standards. These aspects are important for welfare considerations as informal sector workers
may experience bad work conditions (e.g., no social protection) at the same time as lower wages. We opt
here for the legalistic view using de￿nitions which are as comparable as possible across countries.9
For Brazil, the PME does not have explicit information on bene￿ts but workers are asked whether
they hold a formal/registered labor contract (i.e., have a signed labor card or carteira assinada). This
contract entitles them to receive state-mandated bene￿ts such as medical coverage and a pension. Workers
whose job is not regulated by a formal labor contract are then classi￿ed as belonging to the informal
sector. Similar choices are made by Amuedo-Dorantes (2004) and Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002)
using the 1999 Brazilian household survey. The latter study and Henley et al. (2007) show that this
simple de￿nition seems to capture some of the other features commonly used when de￿ning informality
(including ￿rm size and job types). For South Africa, the LFS contains several questions regarding fringe
bene￿ts and other aspects of the job that can be used to identify the sector, in particular questions
regarding whether the ￿rm provides medical aid and deducts unemployment insurance contributions.
This measure of informality signi￿cantly overlaps with the self-reported status also provided in the data.
The informal sector in Mexico is frequently de￿ned along the productive view, both in recent studies
(e.g., Maloney, 1999, Gong and van Soest, 2002) and by Mexican authorities. In contrast, and to improve
comparability with other countries, we opt for a characterization more in line with the legalistic view and
based upon whether employees contribute to (and bene￿t from) social security (see also Martin, 1999,
Bosch and Maloney, 2007, 2008).10
3.3 Sample Selection
We restrict samples to urban male workers aged 15-65 and not engaged in any form of education or
training. The main reason for focusing on men only is that a large share of women in the three countries
under study are not active or are engaged in unpaid work. Including women would require to account
for participation in the labor market which is not yet standard in quantile estimations (see Albrecht et
al., 2004). We select only workers in the private sector, which excludes unpaid family workers (whose
implicit earnings are di¢ cult to evaluate) and public sector employees; for the latter, there are indeed
important di⁄erences in institutional mechanisms regulating wages, both across countries and compared
to the private sector. We restrict the sample to workers that are observed at least twice in the data
9The challenge arising from the di¢ culty to de￿ne informality in a uniform fashion given the non-uniformity of the data
sources and the more fundamental di⁄erences across labor markets is discussed in other comparative studies like Marcouiller
et al., (1997), Duryea et al. (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007), J￿tting et al. (2007) and Perry et al. (2006).
10While the classi￿cations obtained with the di⁄erent de￿nitions (job type, ￿rm size, social protection) do not overlap
perfectly, they lead to similar transition patterns between sectors (cf., Gong et al., 2004).
5and whose observations are consecutive over the periods of the survey.11 In South Africa (resp. Brazil),
whites and asians (resp. asians) are excluded from the sample as they represent less than 1% of the
informal sector. Results do not change signi￿cantly when including these groups.
An important step in the selection is the focus on salary workers only, a choice not speci￿c to the
present study (see for instance Badaoui et al., 2008). We argue that self-employed workers form a vastly
heterogeneous group, from street vendor to professional independent workers, and deserve a particular
study. Also, self-employment income is typically subject to substantial measurement error and incorpo-
rates other elements (e.g., returns to risk) that would not be included in wages.
This selection leaves a sample size of 13,710 men for Brazil, 9,099 men for South Africa, and 100,868
men for Mexico. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix and discussed below.
3.4 Adjusted Wages
Real hourly wages are calculated from the gross monthly wages and reported work hours in the primary
job. For the sake of comparability between countries and over time, earnings are converted into 2002
international dollars using relevant CPI de￿ ators and PPP adjustment factors drawn from the World
Development Indicators. The premium associated with formal sector employment is overestimated if
taxes paid by registered workers are ignored. Thus we use available information to adjust gross wages for
taxes in this sector, which is consistent with the chosen de￿nition of formality.12
Adjusting for taxes is sometimes seen as a di¢ cult exercise because of data limitation . Yet we argue
that the datasets at hand and the nature of the tax systems in the countries under study allow for a
reasonable approximation of the taxes paid on labor income. Tax rules are summarized in Table 1 in
the Appendix.13 The tax system in all three countries is progressive income tax but the top marginal
tax rates are not very high by international standards (27.5% in Brazil and 28% in Mexico). A ￿ at
rebate (depending on age) is applied in South Africa while in Mexico, a refundable (and progressive) tax
credit bene￿ts those earning less than twice the minimum wage. In these countries, income taxation is
purely individualized while in Brazil, taxpayers can also ￿le jointly and bene￿t from a deduction for each
dependent relative (spouse, if inactive, and children aged under 22, or 25 if in education). We have used
available information on family links for the main adults in the household and assumed that other adults
were single. For the latter, we thus potentially overestimate tax liabilities; yet most of them are young
workers with low wages, and hence likely exempt from tax payment (as detailed below, only the top 20%
of the gross wage distribution is liable for income tax). Another usual limitation to tax calculation is the
absence of information concerning capital income, which is therefore excluded from the tax base in our
simulations. This should concern only a very limited number of people at the very top of the distribution.
11In the ￿nal selection, all Brazilian workers are observed only twice; for South Africa and Mexico, respectively 40% and
80% of the workers are observed at least three times.
12As often, it is di¢ cult to evaluate the value of medical coverage for formal sector employees and almost impossible to
account for the present value of future bene￿ts such as pensions. Consistently, we do not adjust wages for social security
contributions, arguing that social security coverage can be seen as a pure insurance mechanism. We have nonetheless
calculated these contributions in order to compute more accurately taxable income, often based on gross income minus part
of social security contributions.
13Detailed descriptions of the tax-bene￿t systems in force in South Africa, Brazil and Mexico are available from the South
African Revenue Service (http://www.sars.gov.za), Immervoll et al (2007) and Absal￿n and Urzœa (2008) respectively. The
description of the imputation process adopted in the present study is available upon request.
63.5 Data Description
Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix describe the selected sample as homogenously as possible across countries.
Table 2 shows that wages are on average larger in the formal sector in all three countries, with a larger
average gap in South Africa. Using previous de￿nitions, we ￿nd that informality as a fraction of total
salary work is large in Mexico (43% of our selected sample) and more modest in South Africa (around
11%) and Brazil (15%). For Brazil, this is lower than the share reported in Section 2 (30%) because of
the selection ￿indeed, women and self-employed, excluded from our ￿nal sample, are disproportionately
represented in the informal sector. In terms of location in the wage distribution, we ￿nd that informal
workers are more concentrated in lower quantiles in South Africa and Brazil; in Mexico, workers of
informal and formal sectors are more evenly distributed.
We also estimate the propensity to be in the informal sector using a simple probit model. Results
reported in table 3 point toward a U-shaped relationship between age and informality, that is, the young
and the old workers are more likely to be in the informal sector. In South Africa and Mexico, the
probability of being formal increases with education. For Brazil, only secondary schooling or higher
(i.e., more than 11 years of schooling) guarantees a signi￿cantly smaller probability of being informal.
A weaker link between informality and lower educational attainment in this country is also reported in
Henley et al. (2007).
Figure A1 in the Appendix reports the results of our tax calculations in the form of average tax rates
faced by workers at di⁄erent points of the gross wage distribution. It clearly shows that the redistributive
e⁄ect of taxes in Brazil and South Africa is limited to the top of the distribution. The progressive e⁄ect
is more substantial in Mexico thanks to the refundable tax credit which subsidizes the ￿rst 70% of the
formal sector distribution. Positive taxation kicks in for all three countries at about the same level,
i.e., around 1.2-1.3 times the median wage. As a result, taxation is responsible for slightly reducing
the informal wage penalty for the top quarter of the distribution in all three countries, while it actually
increases the informal wage gap for the ￿rst 70% in Mexico.
4 Econometric Approach
We ￿rst estimate standard Mincer wage equations at the mean and at various quantiles using pooled
years data for each country. Explanatory variables comprise standard human capital information (age,
age squared, education) and other individual/household characteristics reported in table 2 (race, number
of children, marital status, region). Ideally we would like to compare workers on a like-for-like basis within
a certain economic sector. Because this would reduce sample size too much, we conduct estimations on the
whole selection of workers and simply add broad industry dummies to control for the possible structural
di⁄erences between formal and informal sectors.
Next, we rely on panel data to identify (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity. We ￿rst estimate
a ￿xed e⁄ects model on (unbalanced) panel data for each country and compare the result to standard
OLS. Denote I the informal sector dummy, xit a set of controls, ￿i the time-invariant heterogeneity
(the individual ￿xed e⁄ect) and "it an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term accounting for possible
measurement error. The model is simply written:
yit = ￿i + ￿t + xit￿ + Iit￿ + "it
where E ["it j￿i;xit;Iit] = 0 for all individuals i and periods t. The ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) estimator is
7consistent even if unobserved characteristics are correlated with both selection and wages, as long as
those characteristics are constant over time. It will be biased only if sectoral selection is correlated with
the wage variation between periods, for instance if workers move across sectors as a response to anticipated
changes in relative wages. The estimated coe¢ cient b ￿ is interpreted as a measure of the informal sector
wage penalty. Using the ￿ stayers￿as the reference group, this wage penalty is derived from the groups
of people moving in or out of the informal sector. The intuition for the identi￿cation of the wage gap
is best illustrated with a simple two-period example. Assume that, with a strictly positive probability,
some individuals move from the informal sector to the formal sector and others move in the opposite
direction between period 1 and period 2. Asymptotically, we can observe:
E [yi2 ￿ yi1jIi1 = k;Ii2 = k] = ￿ for k = 0;1
E [yi2 ￿ yi1jIi1 = 0;Ii2 = 1] = ￿ + ￿
E [yi2 ￿ yi1jIi1 = 1;Ii2 = 0] = ￿ ￿ ￿
with ￿ = ￿2 ￿ ￿1 + (xi2 ￿ xi1)￿:
Identi￿cation on the population of ￿ movers￿(second and third lines above) is standard. Nonetheless, we
provide important checks regarding the frequency of the moves and the nature of movers (section 5);
we also verify that recorded moves correspond to genuine job changes rather than to measurement error
(section 6). We assume for now that the wage penalty ￿ is constant over time but relax this assumption
later on (section 6).
Next, we consider the extension of the standard QR model to longitudinal data. For any worker i, we
can write the ￿th quantile of the y distribution conditionally on observables as:
F￿1
yit (￿ j xit) = ￿i + ￿t(￿) + xit￿(￿) + Iit￿(￿), 8￿ 2 [0;1]:
Fixed e⁄ects ￿￿ s have a pure location shift e⁄ect on the conditional quantiles of the response (i.e., they
a⁄ect all quantiles in the same way). As explained by Koenker (2004), it is unrealistic to attempt to
estimate distributional shift ￿i(￿) if the number of periods of observations is too small. This is the case
in the present study, and we can only estimate an individual speci￿c location-shift e⁄ect. Importantly,
however, the e⁄ects of the covariates are permitted to depend on the quantile of interest, in particular
the informal sector premium/penalty ￿(￿). Following Koenker (2004), we can estimate this model for









wj￿￿j(yi ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿t(￿j) ￿ xit￿(￿j) ￿ Iit￿(￿j)) (1)
where ￿￿(u) = u(￿ ￿ 1(u ￿ 0)) denotes the quantile loss function, with 1(￿) the indicator function. The
w weights control for the relative in￿ uence of the J quantiles on the estimation of the ￿xed e⁄ects (in
the application we simply use Tukey￿ s trimean weights: wj = 0:5 ￿ jj ￿ 0:5j). As the dimensions of this
problem are extremely large, it is not possible to time-demean the data as often done for FE estimations.
Fortunately, the design matrix has a very sparse structure ￿the majority of its elements are equal to 0
￿and can be handled by the algorithm of Koenker and Ng (2005). An alternative and simpler approach
to estimate ￿xed e⁄ects quantile regression (FE-QR) has been recently suggested by Canay (2008). It
exploits the assumption that ￿ terms are pure location shifters, so that they can be estimated in a ￿rst
step by traditional mean estimations (for instance by OLS estimator in ￿rst di⁄erences). Then it is
possible to use the estimated b ￿i in order to regress corrected wages b yi = yi ￿ b ￿i on the other covariates
by traditional QR. We found that both methods lead to very similar results (a detailed comparison is
available upon request).
85 Empirical Results
5.1 Characterizing the Movers
As explained above, movers play a key role in the identi￿cation of the wage gap and deserve some
attention. We ￿rst check that the number of transitions across sectors is large enough for a valid use
of the FE estimator. We ￿nd that 8% of panel observations in Brazil, 12% in South Africa and 24% in
Mexico correspond to sector changes, which are reassuring numbers regarding the possibility to identify
￿xed e⁄ects.14 In section 6, we verify that these transitions are associated with job changes and are not
driven by measurement error.
We also check that movers are not too speci￿c. Firstly, we verify that transitions across sectors are
large enough at quantile levels and are not restricted to certain groups of workers. Figure A2 in the
Appendix depicts the number of movers in and out of the informal sector between two periods, averaged
over the di⁄erent waves of the panel. For the sake of comparability, it is expressed as a proportion of
the size of base-period informal sector quintiles. It turns out that a substantial number of workers move
in both directions and do so at all earnings levels. Transitions are slightly more frequent in the upper
quintiles in South Africa and Mexico and occur more often from informal to formal sector (especially in
Mexico and in lower quintiles in Brazil).15 Overall, however, they do not seem to be overly concentrated
at certain levels of the wage distribution. Secondly, we characterize the movers by running additional
probits (dependent variable equals to one if the worker moves). It turns out that movers are not extremely
di⁄erent from the overall selected population in terms of their observed characteristics (pseudo-R2 are
around 0.02 for Brazil, 0.06 for South Africa and 0.01 for Mexico).16 We also ￿nd that those moving
from formal to informal sectors are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from workers going in the other direction.17
5.2 Estimation Results
Our main results are represented graphically in the rest of this section. For each country, we report the
estimated coe¢ cient b ￿ (the informal sector wage penalty) from OLS, QR, FE and FE-QR. In table 4 in
the Appendix, we also report the wage penalty at the mean, the median and two extreme quantiles as
well as the (bootstrapped) standard errors. Because of space limitation, we have not reported the full
estimation tables, which are available upon request.18
14The lower rate for Brazil partly translates the fact that workers can move at most once, as explained in the data section.
When ignoring workers who move more than once in the two other countries, ￿ows become more comparable.
15We refrain from drawing any direct conclusions regarding the reasons behind these ￿ raw￿transitions. A more in-depth
interpretation of inter-sector ￿ows would require some adjustments for turnover and job creation as performed in Bosch and
Maloney (1997) and Maloney (1999).
16Only a few characteristics are signi￿cant. Movers seem to be younger and more often single. Moves occur more frequently
within certain sectors (e.g., construction and trade in Brazil). There is no clear evidence for the role of education.
17Note that the FE approach retained in the present study or in Badaoui et al. (2008) remains agnostic about the reasons
why people change sector. As explained in the introduction, the joint estimation of sector choice and wage equations in
the QR framework is not standard. Nonetheless, additional checks show that better wage prospects only partly explain
why people move. We ￿nd that transitions (in either direction) are associated with wage increases in the upper part of the
distribution but with wage losses at the bottom, especially for those leaving the formal sector. These additional results are
available upon request.
18Their ￿ndings can be summarized as follows. Returns to education typically increase with the education level. Returns
to experience (here proxied by age) generally increase as we move to higher quantiles; the same is true for education
with a few exceptions (i.e., at lower education levels in Mexico and for university education in South Africa). Many
interpretations are possible: higher ability workers may bene￿t from higher school quality or obtain higher returns to a
given experience/education level. More country-speci￿c results also appear, for instance regional di⁄erences (e.g., workers
9Brazil
Figure 1 con￿rms the existence of an informal sector wage penalty for Brazil. It shows that pooled
QR estimates are not contained in the con￿dence interval surrounding the OLS coe¢ cient and reveal
important di⁄erences along the wage distribution. In brief, the penalty faced by informal sector workers
is very large at lower quantiles and disappears at the top. Estimates of the FE-QR give similar results
but display a smaller penalty along the whole distribution.19 Precisely, the (conditional) wage penalty
for informal workers ranges between 8% at the bottom (compared to 17.5% with pooled QR) to around
zero at the top. Interestingly, these results are qualitatively close to those of Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto


































Note: bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines.
Figure 1: Fixed E⁄ects Estimations for Brazil
South Africa
For South Africa, ￿gure 2 reports a wage penalty of around 69% at the median according to QR on the
pooled sample, slightly larger than the average penalty. It is in line with recent results of Kingdon and
Knight (2007). When accounting for unobserved heterogeneity using FE, the (conditional) wage penalty
decreases at all levels, down to around 18% on average.20 Interestingly, the wage gap is not uniform and
a similar pattern to Brazil emerges: the conditional wage gap is very moderate at the top while a large
penalty of around 30% remains at the bottom.
in Sao Paulo bene￿t from higher pay) and di⁄erences by race in Brazil and South Africa. Results of FE regressions are less
easy to comment upon since only time-variant regressors are included.
19Note that standard errors are smaller when using standard FE estimations since many less variables are used.
20This result is also found in Badaoui et al. (2008). Yet these authors ￿nd a smaller average wage gap as they consider





































Note: bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines.
Figure 2: Fixed E⁄ects Estimations for South Africa
Mexico
Results for Mexico are presented in ￿gure 3. Pooled QR give very similar estimates to what we obtain
for Brazil, with a wage penalty ranging between 30% at the bottom and 5% at the top. Like in Brazil
and South Africa, accounting for FE considerably decreases the extent of the penalty. The remaining
wage gap tends to disappear at the top while it is signi￿cant and still large (around 15%) at the bottom.
Thus, when focusing on salary workers, our results indicate that the nature of the Mexican labor market
is not genuinely di⁄erent compared to the two other countries under consideration.21
6 Robustness Checks and Extensions
6.1 Job Movers
Admittedly, inter-sector moves could re￿ ect mere measurement error, i.e., ￿ aws in reporting the correct
sector status at certain periods. To check this point, we ￿rst verify whether sectoral transitions are
accompanied by actual job changes, as indicated by changes in occupation type, industry type, ￿rm size
or tenure. Table 5 in the Appendix shows that of all inter-sector moves (which potentially include several
moves per worker over the relevant period), 75% in Brazil , 87% in South Africa and 80% in Mexico are
accompanied by a change in at least one of these characteristics. Notably, a third of sectoral moves in
South Africa and Mexico are concomitant with changes in ￿rm size only, which does not fully guarantee
that actual job change has occurred. However, even if the worker does not actually move to a di⁄erent
￿rm, a dramatic change in ￿rm size/organization might be treated as such. Indeed, genuine changes in
21Note that the literature reporting informal sector wage premium and describing the informal sector as a desirable sector




































Note: bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals represented by dashed lines.
Figure 3: Fixed E⁄ects Estimations for Mexico
the formal/informal nature of jobs may still occur. As it expands, a ￿rm becomes more at risk of being
caught defaulting on stipulated regulation and is therefore more likely to register its workers. At the
same time, it may also change its wage setting policy.
Furthermore, we aim to ensure that our results are robust to measurement error and we reestimate
FE-QR solely on job movers. According to ￿gure 4, results appear not to be fundamentally di⁄erent in
this case. We further restrict estimations to job moves which are not solely de￿ned by a ￿rm size change;
we ￿nd that results do not not change dramatically in Brazil and Mexico. The informal wage gap tends
however to increase in South Africa, especially in the upper part.
6.2 A Closer Look at the Top
One may genuinely wonder why informal sector workers at the top of the distribution do not face a large
wage penalty. To characterize these workers, we run a probit on the population of informal workers
where the binary variable takes a value of one if the worker is in the top quintile. In all countries, the
top paid are signi￿cantly older, are more often located in the Sao Paulo region in Brazil or in large urban
areas in Mexico, generally have higher education levels (with the exception of South Africa where they
more often hold a vocational degree) and more often hold managerial or administrative positions. These
simple descriptive facts convey that at the top of the distribution, informal sector workers share similar
characteristics with their formal sector counterparts but are nonetheless categorized in the informal sector
according to the legalistic de￿nition at use.
Badaoui et al. (2007) theoretically show that the informal sector wage penalty is essentially due to
a ￿rm size e⁄ect: larger ￿rms pay higher wages and, at the same time, have higher incentives to be
registered since they are more likely to be caught defaulting. Probit estimations show that compared
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Figure 4: Robustness Check: Estimations on Job Movers
￿rms in South Africa and Mexico.22 In Brazil, however, these workers tend to be more often in large
￿rms and less frequently in very small ￿rms, making them even more comparable to top formal sector
employees.23 Consequently, if the ￿rm size explanation is valid, we should expect some penalty at the
top of the distribution in South Africa and Mexico but not in Brazil. Corrected measures of the informal
wage gap reported in the previous sub-section point in that direction. Thus, our results seem to support
empirically the prediction made in Badaoui et al. (2007), not only on average but also for top wage
workers.24
6.3 Between-group and Time Variations
The FE-QR model simply uses a dummy variable for the informal sector and may be seen as misspeci￿ed.
While it is well known that, in case of misspeci￿cation, least square regression provides a minimum mean
squared error linear approximation to the true functions, Angrist et al. (2006) provide a similar result
for quantile regression. Therefore our ￿ndings have meaningful interpretation even if the true informal
wage penalty depends on the covariates.
Nonetheless, we examine the heterogeneity of the informal wage penalty by interacting it with workers￿
age and education levels. Figure 5 essentially shows that younger workers face larger penalties, especially
in Brazil and South Africa. This is in line with previous results by Bosch and Maloney (2007) who
suggest that informal salaried work may correspond more closely to the standard queuing view for younger
workers. Education levels seem to a⁄ect the wage gap only at the two extremes of the distribution. At
22In South Africa, half of top informal workers are located in ￿rms of less than 4 employees compared to 3% of their
formal sector counterparts. In Mexico, 18% of them work in ￿rms of more than 16 employees compared to 72% of top
formal sector employees.
23According to Kenyon and Kapaz (2005), tax evasion in Brazil is not limited to small and medium-size enterprises, as is
commonly believed. Even large and very large ￿rms report only moderate compliance. Note also that in our data, around
86% (resp. 96%) of informal (resp. formal) sector workers in the top quintile are located in ￿rms with 11 or more employees,
compared to 53% for informal workers in lower quintiles.
24We also ￿nd that informal workers in the lower part of the distribution tend to work in small ￿rms compared to their
formal sector counterparts, which is consistent with the signi￿cant penalty reported. This also indicates some overlap
between the legalistic de￿nition and the ￿rm-size de￿nition. Yet, ￿ndings for the top workers in Brazil give support to the
shift in the literature (and in ILO practice) from the productive view to the legalistic view. Indeed, the latter recognizes
that informal employment can also be found in large ￿rms (Perry et al., 2006).
13the top, the informal wage penalty is smaller in all countries ￿and even turns into a premium in Brazil ￿
for those with higher education. This could be related to the fact that some of the top informal workers
have similar characteristics as their formal sector counterparts, as previously discussed. In the lower
part of the distribution, a larger penalty is observed for high education groups in Brazil and Mexico.
This possibly re￿ ects that education has a higher return in the formal sector, either because it acts as
a signalling device or because this sector is capital-intensive and highly rewarded as a complement to
capital inputs (Gong and Van Soest, 2002).
We have assumed so far that the penalty is constant over time. Yet it may be necessary to relax
this assumption as our data spans several years (up to 7 years for South Africa). We can estimate a
time-varying wage gap ￿t by simply interacting the informal sector dummy with year dummies. Results
are reported in Figure 6. For all countries, it appears that the time trend is smoother for the conditional
wage gap (as estimated by FE-QR) compared to the raw wage di⁄erential. The trend is very stable in
Mexico, with a median penalty around 9% over the period 2004-2007. For Brazil, the informal wage
penalty is relatively constant around 4% of the median. Yet the period of economic slowdown of the early
2000s is characterized by a smaller penalty (and even a premium in the upper half of the distribution),
re￿ ecting higher wage depression in the formal sector. In South Africa, the median gap oscillates around
16% in the ￿rst half of the 2000s and doubles in recent years characterized by higher economic growth.
Thus, it seems that wages are more procyclical in the formal sector. This interpretation is consistent
with the fact that workers in this sector bene￿t from the surge in the prices of export commodities, as
opposed to informal sector workers employed more frequently in domestic activities like construction and
small services.25 These results are in apparent contrast with the view that formal sector wages are less
responsive to market forces because of labor market regulations like minimum wages. However, evidence
for Brazil in ￿gure 6 is consistent with the fact that downward rigidity in the formal sector occurs in
lower quantiles (the penalty is relatively constant over time for the 10th centile); formal sector wages ￿
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Figure 5: Informal Wage Penalty: Interactions
25However, this description is static. A more in-depth analysis would require to account for the e⁄ect of the business












































Figure 6: Informal Wage Penalty: Time Variations
7 Concluding Discussion
This study complements the existing literature on informality by measuring the informal sector wage gap
in Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. Reported earnings have been adjusted to account for taxes paid in
the formal sector. Fixed e⁄ects quantile estimations are used to perform a distributional analysis while
accounting for workers￿unobserved heterogeneity. A few interesting conclusions and policy implications
are derived from this exercise. Firstly, our results conform to the stylized fact that workers in the formal
sector have ￿ better￿observed and unobserved characteristics at all points of the distribution. Secondly,
we illustrate the importance of distributional analyses. Standard measures of the informal sector penalty
at the mean fail to capture the important within-group heterogeneity found in our results. Thirdly, the
distributional pattern obtained by FE-QR is qualitatively similar across all countries. Precisely, most of
the wage gap at the top of the distribution disappears. In the lower part, and for younger workers at
every quantile, large (unexplained) informal wage penalties remain and could be consistent with some
segmentation for these workers (see Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002).26 The fact that the wage penalty
is not constant shows that policies aimed to levy labor market regulations should not be applied in a
blanket fashion. The key to better functioning and more equitable labor markets may also pertain to
additional e⁄orts towards building workers￿capabilities.
Some of the limitations of the present study are well-known. In particular, wage gap measures are
only part of a more complete welfare analysis. As Badaoui et al. (2008), we have attempted to account
for taxes to improve the rending of ￿nancial situations in both sectors. Yet some e⁄orts should be
made to account for all cash and non-pecuniary advantages attached to a particular sector. This is a
considerable challenge, given data limitation and the di¢ culty to measure welfare (for instance to impute
future bene￿ts like pensions). Notwithstanding, Bourguignon et al. (2007) show that what makes the
Brazilian distribution of income so unequal, in addition to the structure of returns to human capital, is
the poor access to non-labor incomes like pensions.
Another issue is the potential limitations in the way unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. Firstly,
while IV estimations face the usual problem of ￿nding convincing instruments, the FE approach is poten-
tially subject to measurement error, an issue carefully investigated in our analysis. Yet, it is encouraging
26Interestingly, this pattern also applies to South Africa ￿a country characterized by a smaller informal sector and the
presence of large unemployment.
15to ￿nd that for Brazil, estimates obtained by IV-QR are relatively similar to ours when using FE-QR
(cf. Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002). More systematic comparisons of the two methods for the same
country and the same period should be carried out. Secondly, sector choice is not modelled in the present
QR framework. To explicitly account for selection, instruments could be used in the FE model but would
require time variation.
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Figure A2: Distribution of Movers in/out of the Informal Sector
20Table 1: Tax Schedules
marginal rate Others
Brazil 0…10,485 0.0 … 1.3 0%
10,486 … 20,971 1.3 … 2.6 15%
20,971 + 2.6 + 27.5%
South  Africa 0…9,091 0.0 … 0.6 0%
9,091 … 13,468 0.6 … 0.9 18%
13,468 … 26,936 0.9 … 1.7 25%
26,936 … 37,037 1.7 … 2.4 30%
37,037 … 57,239 2.4 … 3.7 35%
57,239 … 80,808 3.7 … 5.2 38%
80,808 + 5.2 + 40%
Mexico 0 … 656 0.0 … 0.1 1.9%
656 … 5,570 0.1 … 1.0 6.4%
5,570 … 9,789 1.0 … 1.8 10.9%
9,789 … 11,379 1.8 … 2.1 16%
11,379 … 13,624 2.1 … 2.5 17.9%
13,624 … 27,478 2.5 … 5.0 19.9%
27,478 … 43,309 5.0 … 7.9 22%
43,309 + 7.9 + 28%
Notes:  this  table  summarizes  the  tax  schedules  in  force  in  Brazil,  South  Africa  and  Mexico  in  years  2002,  2002  and  2007  respectively.  Our  calculations  also
account  for  structural  changes  and  nominal  adjustments  of  tax  bands  occurring  at  other  years.  We  also  account  for  different  treatments  of  different  groups.  E.g.,
for  persons  aged  65+  in  South  Africa,  there  is  no  second  bracket,  the  theshold  to  the  third  is  14,356  and  the  rebate  is  increased  by  1,010.
@  The  upper  threshold  of  the  first  positive-rate  bracket  (0.6  and  0  times  the  median  income  in  South  Africa  and  Mexico  respectively)  is  effectively  higher  (around
1.2)  because  of  the  rebate/tax  credit.
#  Hence  someone  at  the  end  of  the  2nd  bracket  (5,570)  has  a  negative  net  tax  liability  of  -178;  someone  close  to  the  end  of  the  3rd  bracket  has  to  pay  a  net  tax
of  about  500
People with earnings in the first 3
brackets also receive a refundable
tax credit from PPP$ 538 (for zero
earnings) down to PPP$ 288 @ #
in 2002 PPP$ in % of median income
brackets (annual income)
A tax rebate of PPP$ 1,636 also
applies for all. The upper threshold of
the first positive-rate bracket (0.6
times the median) is effectively
higher due to the rebate @
21Table 2: Selected Samples: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Gross hourly wage 4.77 3.53 2.54 0.99 2.77 2.30
(6.94) (4.92) (3.67) (1.60) (2.33) (1.96)
Net hourly wage 4.43 3.53 2.39 0.99 2.75 2.30
(5.52) (4.92) (3.07) (1.60) (1.91) (1.96)
Demographics
Age 36.5 35.9 38.5 38.9 34.6 32.1
# children 3.2 3.3 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.6
household size 3.8 3.9 5.9 6.3 4.6 4.9
% married 0.64 0.54 0.63 0.47 0.62 0.44
Black 0.07 0.07 Black 0.74 0.86
Brown 0.32 0.33 Coloured 0.26 0.14
White 0.61 0.60
Education
No Schooling 0.01 0.01 No schooling 0.09 0.15 No Schooling 0.02 0.04
1-3 years 0.04 0.04 Primary 0.31 0.40 1-3 years 0.04 0.08
4-7 years 0.24 0.24 Secondary 0.53 0.42 4-7 years 0.24 0.34
8-10 years 0.18 0.18 Vocational 0.07 0.03 8-10 years 0.45 0.40
11+ years 0.53 0.53 University 0.001 0.00 11+ years 0.25 0.13
Province
Recife 0.06 0.04 Western Cape 0.21 0.11 > 100,000 Inhab. 0.72 0.56
Salvador 0.07 0.06 Eastern Cape 0.09 0.16 15,000-99,999 0.11 0.17
Belo Horizonte 0.16 0.11 Northern Cape 0.08 0.05 2,500-14,999 0.08 0.14
Rio de Janeiro 0.27 0.35 Free State 0.11 0.08 < 2,500 0.08 0.13
Sao Paulo 0.25 0.29 Kwazulu-Natal 0.11 0.14





Manufacturing 0.32 0.19 0.36 0.08 0.39 0.20
Construction 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.11 0.37
Trade & Retail 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.15 0.26 0.16
Services 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.09
Transport and Comm. 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.18
# panel observations
# workers




Statistics concern the selected sample of male aged 15-65, neither in education nor in the public sector. Data covers the period 2002-2007 for Brazil,
2001-2007  for  South  Africa  and  2005-2008  for  Mexico.  Log  hourly  wages  in  2002  PPP  international  $.  Standard  deviations  in  brackets.






22Table 3: Probit: Informal Sector
Variable
Demographics Ref: white,  single black,  single Single
Age -0.217 (0.017) -0.068 (0.015) -0.130 (0.005)
Age squared 0.003 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
# children -0.028 (0.038) 0.091 (0.021) 0.003 (0.005)
household size 0.067 (0.034) -0.022 (0.010) 0.039 (0.004)
Married -0.414 (0.061) -0.281 (0.061) -0.729 (0.026)
Black -0.157 (0.115) Coloured -0.246 (0.087)
Brown -0.086 (0.070)
Education Ref: no  schooling no  schooling no  schooling
1-3 Years -0.079 (0.256) Primary -0.331 (0.080) 1-3 Years -0.291 (0.061)
4-7 Years 0.068 (0.227) Secondary -0.976 (0.087) 4-7 Years -0.686 (0.053)
8-10 Years -0.136 (0.232) Vocational -1.501 (0.143) 8-10 Years -1.281 (0.054)
11+ Years -0.575 (0.228) University -1.597 (0.849) 11+ Years -1.759 (0.057)
Province Ref: Recife Western  Cape >100,000  Inhab.
Salvador 0.085 (0.155) Eastern Cape 0.938 (0.105) 15,000-99,999 0.728 (0.026)
Belo Horizonte -0.193 (0.136) Northern Cape 0.203 (0.119) 2,500-14,999 0.962 (0.029)
Rio de Janeiro 0.473 (0.128) Free State 0.161 (0.121) < 2,500 0.685 (0.029)
Sao Paulo 0.530 (0.131) Kwazulu-Natal 0.515 (0.113)




Economic  sector Ref: Construction Construction Construction
Manufacturing -1.092 (0.092) -1.521 (0.088) -1.818 (0.022)
Trade & Retail -0.451 (0.090) -1.041 (0.082) -1.549 (0.023)
Services -0.577 (0.093) 0.075 (0.077) -1.382 (0.026)
Transport and Comm -0.835 (0.106) 0.143 (0.100) -0.140 (0.027)
Period Ref: year  2002 year  2001 year  2005
2003 -0.040 (0.083) 2002 -0.242 (0.069) 2006 -0.021 (0.015)
2004 -0.045 (0.092) 2003 -0.180 (0.080) 2007 -0.099 (0.018)
2005 -0.095 (0.093) 2004 -0.072 (0.090) 2008 -0.716 (0.020)
2006 -0.146 (0.094) 2005 0.082 (0.091)
2007 -0.330 (0.103) 2006 0.115 (0.092)
2007 0.171 (0.093)
Constant 2.533 (0.418) 0.685 (0.316) 4.394 (0.100)
Dependent  variable  =  1  if  informal  sector.  Standard  errors  are  in  brackets.
Brazil South Africa Mexico
23Table 4: Informal Wage Gap: Estimation Results
coef. std.err. coef. std.err coef. std.err coef. std.err
OLS and pooled QR
Brazil -0.107 0.014 -0.160 0.012 -0.133 0.011 -0.048 0.023
South Africa -0.627 0.025 -0.627 0.036 -0.689 0.035 -0.582 0.028
Mexico -0.191 0.003 -0.274 0.005 -0.201 0.002 -0.120 0.004
FE and FE-QR
Brazil -0.034 0.015 -0.060 0.005 -0.034 0.002 -0.017 0.006
South Africa -0.188 0.027 -0.288 0.022 -0.179 0.009 -0.112 0.015
Mexico -0.050 0.003 -0.159 0.001 -0.087 0.001 -0.045 0.001
Informal  wage  penalty  =  estimated  coefficient  of  the  informal  sector  dummy.  All  estimations  based  on  the  variables  reported  in  the
descriptive  statistics,  except  time-invariant  characteristics  (race,  education  and  region)  in  the  fixed  effects  estimations.
Mean Q=0.2 Q=0.5 Q=0.8
Estimation methods
Table 5: Sector Moves versus Job Changes
Brazil South Africa Mexico
N N N
Inter-sector moves* 2,312 2,405 63,646
Job changes according to changes in:** inclusive exclusive inclusive exclusive inclusive exclusive
Occupation 1,040 0.45 0.09 449 0.19 0.02 20,641 0.32 0.03
Industry 854 0.37 0.06 897 0.37 0.03 20,802 0.33 0.03
Firm size *** 700 0.30 0.10 1,834 0.76 0.34 45,555 0.72 0.34
Tenure 763 0.33 0.08 458 0.19 0.03 n/a
Unexplained 580 0.25 319 0.13 12,730 0.20
***  Firm  size:  change  in  reported  firm  size  category  (Brazil:  1-5,  6-10,  11+;  South  Africa:  1-4,  5-9,  10-19,  20-49,  50+;  Mexico:  1-5,  6-10,  11-15,  16-50,  51+)
*  in  number  of  moves  across  sectors,  either  way  and  as  %  of  all  panel  observations  (note:  there  are  potentially  several  moves  per  worker)
**  job  moves  in  number  and  in  %  of  sector  moves  (inclusive  =  job  change  according  to  at  least  this  characteristic;  exclusive  =  job  change  according  to  this  characteristic only).  Ex:
45%  of  Brazilian  sector  moves  are  concomitant  with  job  changes  including  occupational  change;  9%  of  Brazilian  sector  moves  are  accompanied  by  occupational  change  only.
% % %
0.24 0.12 0.08
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